Abstract: This paper examines U
Introduction
The global financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 and erupted in full force in the fall of 2008 had a profound effect on US investor portfolios. According to U.S. Flow of Funds statistics, total U.S. holdings of securities -credit market instruments, equity, and mutual fund shares -fell by nearly $13 trillion between fall 2007 and spring 2009, a loss of more than 20 percent over the 18-month period. As global investors lost faith in the value of mortgage-and other asset-backed securities (ABS) and other structured products that purported to transform subprime housing loans into AAA rated securities, they tried to unwind these and other more risky investment positions for the safety of home investments in safe and liquid assets. This tendency to leave foreign markets for home during financial crises has recently been documented in a growing literature on capital retrenchment (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) , Forbes and Warnock (2011) and Fratzscher (2011) ).
In this paper, we contrast the behavior of U.S. investors during the global financial crisis with their response to the ongoing euro-area crisis, which began to emerge in late 2009. Our study attempts to address two questions : First, having been "fooled once" by the promise of higher returns for only slightly increased risk in the ABS market during the global financial crisis, have U.S. investors become cautious during the European debt crisis and scaled back their investment in foreign securities? Second, in particular, how have U.S. investors adjusted their holdings of European securities? Have they pulled back or do they continue to have large exposures that could prove equally risky should European financial markets become even more unsettled? With these questions, we provide new evidence on how U.S. investors are managing their international portfolios during a period of great uncertainty and very low risk-free interest rates.
Since the pioneering work of French and Poterba (1991) , it has been well known that investors exhibit a home bias in their international portfolio investment, i.e., they tend to hold too little of their financial wealth in foreign assets when compared with the benchmark of standard portfolio theory.
1 Traditional portfolio choice theories frame the home bias as a function of the benefits of holding foreign foreign assets less the costs (Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) ).
Alternative approaches explain home bias by examining portfolio choice under uncertainty (Uppal and Wang (2003) ), information asymmetry (Brennan and Cao (1997) , Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004) , and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) ), or familiarity bias (Huberman (2001) and Cao et al (2011) ).
Home bias during financial crises has received increasing attention among researchers in recent years. All else equal, theories of portfolio choice under uncertainty predict that an increase in uncertainty, information asymmetry, or heightening of familiarity bias during crisis periods would lead investors to reduce their foreign portfolio share and thus increase their home bias. Among empirical studies using capital flows and transactions data, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) suggests that the capital retrenchment during the global financial crisis led to an increase in portfolio home bias. By examining U.S. investors' responses during the European debt crisis in comparison to the global financial crisis, our paper sheds new light on changes in U.S. investors' home bias during crisis periods. Our study also touches on a potential vulnerability for Europe. As is the case for many developed economies, the European financial system has huge claims on foreigners and huge liabilities to foreign investors. Should the crisis spark an international retreat from European investments, the region's troubles would be compounded.
1 For detailed reviews of the home bias literature, see Lewis (2011) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) . Eastern European debt and even to peripheral euro area government debt, especially in 2011, we also see some shifts into safer, more highly rated securities in the financial sector.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a background review of changes of U.S. investor portfolios during the global financial crisis. Section 2 describes data used and basic statistics of U.S. investment portfolios abroad. Section 3 examines patterns of U.S.
holdings and net investment flows into Europe, and how they have changed since the onset of the European crisis. Section 4 presents detailed evidence of U.S. investors' responses to European government debt and financial debt. Section 5 concludes.
U.S. Investor Portfolios and the Global Financial Crisis
Defining characteristics of the U.S. financial landscape leading up to the financial crisis include the rapid growth of the shadow banking system and the associated expansion of alternative credit instruments, including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), ABS, and other structured products. The causes and consequences of this buildup have been examined extensively by policy makers and researchers. For example, Gorton (2008 Gorton ( , 2009 ) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2008) describe the process by which loans, some of which were of dubious quality, were transformed into highly rated structured investment products. Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, and Willen, (2008) and Demyanyk and van Hemert (2009) (domestic and foreign) were likely crowded out of the market for conventional safe and liquid securities and enticed by highly rated alternatives offering slightly better yields. Tarullo (2012) discusses other sources of the demand for "safe" and liquid assets in the years before the crisis.
The buildup in what turned out ex post to be risky asset positions and the collapse in U.S.
investor wealth during the financial crisis is apparent from U.S. Flow of Funds statistics. As shown in Table 1 Although losses directly related to ABS were presumably felt most by these the biggest holders of these securities, overall wealth declines related to the financial crisis were much larger and more widespread. In particular, total U.S. losses on the cross-border portion alone are estimated at $2.7 trillion between Q2 of 2007 and Q1 of 2009, reflecting the role of the U.S. as the "global insurer" by investing abroad primarily in risky assets such as equity which lost value during the crisis while external liabilities were primarily in safe long-term debt securities, including U.S. Treasury securities, which gained in value (Gourinchas, Rey, and Truempler, 2012 ).
We next turn to developments in U.S. investor holdings of foreign securities -especially European securities -since the onset of the European debt crisis to explore whether this "risktaking global investor" nature still holds true and how their home bias has changed.
Data and Basic Statistics

Data
Our data are from the annual Treasury International Capital (TIC) data on U.S. crossborder portfolio holdings. These data are at the security level and measure holdings by all U.S. 
Basic Statistics
As shown in Figure 1 , private portfolio holdings -equity and long-term and short-term debt securities -account for much of U.S. holdings foreign financial assets. 4 In 2011, private portfolio holdings are about three fourths of total U.S. holdings of foreign financial assets, with equity taking about half share and long-term debt securities accounting for 22 percent. Short-2 All U.S. resident custodians and end-investors with holdings of foreign portfolio securities above the reporting threshold (total holdings of $100 million or above as of reporting date) are required to report by law. 3 Thus, a purchase by a U.S. resident of corporate bond issued by a French firm's subsidiary in the United States increases our exposure to France, but does not show up in the TIC data; conversely, a purchase of corporate bond issued by the French parent in Paris would indeed represent a cross-border transaction captured by the TIC. On the other hand, the TIC data include foreign securities that are held by U.S. offices of foreign-headquartered banks because they are U.S.-resident investors and from a balance of payments perspective, that is a U.S.-to-foreign relationship. Similarly, the banking exposure data consolidate banks' worldwide exposures, effectively looking at the parent of the holder rather than the holder itself. So measures of U.S. bank exposure to Europe include not just securities held by domestic offices of U.S.-headquartered banks, but also what is held by the foreign offices of U.S. headquartered banks. Those positions are not included in the TIC because they do not represent a U.S.-to-foreign relationship from a balance of payments perspective. In addition, the banking exposure data also include bank lending in addition to securities holdings, and positions are adjusted for some hedges and collateral. 4 Financial assets exclude direct investment and financial derivatives.
term debt securities holdings are small, with a share of only 4 percent. Besides securities, bank claims, which are shown as net of affiliated office liabilities, account for about 16 percent.
Panels A and B in Table 2 show detailed breakdown by security type of U.S. portfolio holdings abroad and in Europe, respectively. U.S. holdings of foreign securities, particularly equity, decline noticeably in 2008, when the great financial crisis in the United States was most intense.
However, U.S. holdings have held up pretty well as of December 2011 during the European financial crisis, even in European securities.
Patterns of U.S. Holdings and Net Investment Flows into Europe
One way to compare the U.S. investor response during the current crisis with behavior during the global financial crisis is to look at how changes in U.S. portfolio shares have moved relative to shares of the respective securities in total market capitalization. Following standard presentations of the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), we construct a measure of "home bias" in all foreign bonds as 1 minus the ratio of (U.S. holdings of foreign bonds as a share of the total U.S. bond portfolio) to (total bonds outstanding issued by foreign countries as a share of all bonds outstanding):
and similarly for U.S. holdings of foreign equity.
Likewise, we can construct measures of home bias against European bonds:
We construct similar measures for U.S. home bias against all foreign equity and European equity. If U.S. portfolio shares equal market capitalization shares, the ratio will equal 1, and "home bias" will be zero; the closer this ratio is to 1, the higher the measure of "home bias". In practice, existing literature has found ample evidence of considerable home bias (see for example French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) ). Figure 2 shows that U.S. investors' "European bias" has not increased again during the most recent crisis, the slower pace of U.S.
investment into European bonds that we see in our cross-border data has apparently been proportionate to changes in European bond market capitalization. Overall, the European crisis appears to have induced a smaller reaction by U.S. investors than did the global financial crisis.
However, the observation that U.S. investors have not retreated from European bonds or equity does not mean that their current exposure does not continue to pose significant portfolio risks. Indeed, at $2 trillion at end-2011, holdings of European equity account for nearly half of the U.S. cross-order equity portfolio, and also account for roughly 2/3 of the U.S. portfolio investment in Europe. The potentially risky nature of those holdings is evident by the large losses U.S. investors took especially on equity holdings during the global financial crisis. And, by our estimates, U.S. investors lost a further $269 billion on their holdings of European equity in 2011.
One potential explanation for why U.S. investors have not pulled back from European equity even during periods of crisis is that U.S. holdings appear to be concentrated in large Table 4 , almost all flowed to the non-financial sector, with flows into the financial sector near zero, while valuation losses on holdings of financial sector equity were considerably larger than were losses on non-financial sector equity. Thus, U.S. investors have focused their new equity investment flows on the (relatively) stronger performing nonfinancial sector.
We next turn to U.S. investment in European long-term debt securities, focusing our analysis on European long-term debt securities issued by the government and financial sectors, the two largest portions of the U.S. portfolio most directly related to the European financial crisis. However, the TIC data confirm that relatively little of U.S. holdings of European debt securities are claims on the most vulnerable European countries and currencies. As shown in Table 6 , most of our holdings of European debt are concentrated in the core euro-area countries and the United Kingdom, which together account for about three fourths of total European debt held. Debt issued by the peripheral countries amounted to $83 billion, accounting for less than 10 percent of the $1 trillion in total European debt held.
As shown in Table 7 , investors in the "Other" category including banks, security brokerdealers, and hedge funds as well as non-financial corporations and other types of investors together hold about 41 percent of European debt -a smaller share than they held of foreign ABS before the global financial crisis. Mutual funds, the second largest category, account for 30 percent. Pension funds and insurance companies together account for another 30 percent. The holdings of euro peripheral debt are largest for "Other," but still it is relatively small, less than 10 percent of their holdings of European long-term debt securities.
Furthermore, as indicated in Table 8 
Compositional Changes in U.S. Investment in European Government and Financial Debt
Government debt securities
To shed some light on U.S. investors' continued interest in European government debt, we take a closer look at its composition. As shown in Table 8 We perform both pooled OLS regression and a regression with country fixed effects.
Regression results are qualitatively similar, as presented in columns (1) and (2) respectively in Table 9 . Our main finding is that both safety and "reaching for yield" factors appear to be important drivers of capital flows into European government debt during the period. In general, lower CDS spread and higher yield spread are associated with higher U.S. holdings. Between these two offsetting motives, the safety factor seemed to dominate. During the European crisis, however, the positive coefficients on the two interaction terms with yield spread show that the role of the yield factor was amplified in 2010 and 2011, especially in 2011, while the positive although insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms with CDS suggest that country credit risk became less offsetting. In terms of economic significance, column (2) shows that, a onestandard deviation increase in the sovereign yield spread in 2011 would induce an increase in the holding percentage of 0.32 percentage points, other things equal. Given that U.S. investors held, on average, no more than 2 percent of the amount outstanding of any country's government debt, this is economically significant. U.S. Treasury yields were especially low in 2011, and this result suggests that high foreign yields might matter more when U.S. (and also core euro area) yields are especially low. This in turn helps explain why U.S. investors seemed to favor higheryielding Eastern European and peripheral sovereign debt in 2011.
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Since our sample includes a wide range of U.S. investors with different investment objectives, we look into the cross-sectional differences in holdings across the broad categories of investors available in the TIC data. We repeat regression (1) with country fixed effects for each of the four categories of investors that we can identify: mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and other investors. The results are reported in Table 10 . Interestingly, the "reaching-for-yield" factor was significant across almost all investor types in 2011 except pension funds, and it is most significant for mutual funds, followed by "Other". Mutual funds are usually known as return-driven investment vehicles. The "Other" category, which includes banks, broker-dealers, hedge funds, and non-financial corporations, did account for some of the increase in Eastern European and peripheral euro area debt in 2011. Insurance companies, especially life insurers, are required to pay a minimum guaranteed return on their liabilities. As insurers' earnings declined in recent years, they may have been motivated to reach for yield in their fixed-income investments in the current low interest environment. Pension funds also seem to reach for yield to some extent, but just not significantly.
How well did this "reach for yield" strategy work for U.S. investors? To answer this question, we compute weighted average returns on U.S. holdings of European government debt, and estimate how portfolio adjustments contributed to returns in recent years, as presented in Table 11 . In particular, we first calculate the weighted average return on government bonds (i.e., coupon payment divided by price) for each country in each year, and then use the total government debt holdings for each country as the weight to compute total returns on European government debt holdings. European government debt holdings has continued to decline, but it was still notably higher than those without any portfolio adjustments.
Financial debt securities
In this final section we look at U.S. investment in European financial debt. U.S. holdings of European long-term financial debt securities amounted to $373 billion as of end 2011, accounting for the largest share (more than 40 percent) of total European long-term debt holdings. As discussed in Section 3, we saw little net investment into European financial debt in 2010 and 2011. While this could reflect discrimination on the part of U.S. investors away from risky financial sector debt, it might simply reflect changes in issuance over the past couple years.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 6 , net issuance of European financial sector debt has fallen off sharply. However, it has still remained positive, whereas U.S. net investment has been nil.
We find additional evidence of active portfolio management on the part of U.S. investors in their allocation to European asset-backed securities (ABS). Table 12 shows that U.S. investment flows to ABS have been negative in 2010 and 2011, offsetting flows into other forms of financial debt securities. Furthermore, we find that most of the decrease in net inflows to ABS was due to outright sales of ABS still outstanding rather than a passive strategy reflecting maturity of ABS securities held.
We also investigate whether U.S. investors have actively worked to maintain the credit quality of their holdings of European financial debt. As shown in the first row of Table 13 , of all financial debt held, the share of bonds that Moody's rated AAA edged down from 40 percent in 2010 to 38 percent in 2011. This shift is mainly due to the overall deterioration of credit ratings in the financial sector: a smaller fraction of total European financial debt was rated AAA in December 2011 than in the previous year. However, the share of AAA bonds among all bonds added to the portfolio (that is, both newly-issued bonds and existing bonds) was 39 percent in 2010 and 41 percent in 2011, higher than the AAA share of bonds shed from the portfolio (reflecting both maturities and bond sold). The difference between the AAA share in bonds added to and bonds shed from the U.S. portfolio became larger in 2011, suggesting that U.S.
investment flow shifted more towards highly rated financial debt despite their decreased availability as credit conditions worsened.
On the other hand, U.S. holdings of non-financial corporate debt securities have stayed fairly stable in the crisis years (see Table 5 ). Finally, we analyze cross-sectional differences in U.S. holdings of European financial debt by taking a closer look at a sub-sample of financial debt issued by major European banks.
Londono-Yarce, Vega, and Zdinak (2012) find that a financial institution i's contribution to a recently developed systemic risk measure, SRisk, an estimate of the capital shortfall of institution i during times of aggregate financial distress, can help predict financial vulnerabilities in Europe during the financial crisis. 10 We look at a sub-sample of financial debt issued by 43 large
European banks covered in both their sample and our data, and examine how U.S. holdings of financial debt issued by these banks vary with this new risk measure and across different banklevel and security-level characteristics:
where _ , denotes U.S. holdings of financial debt security i as share of total European financial debt held in year t. For security level characteristics, we use a Moody's high rating dummy HR i,t (for credit ratings higher than Aa3) and bond yield. For issuer bank characteristics, we use (1) ln(BA i,t ), the natural log of bank asset BA i,t , (2) SRisk i,t / BA i,t , a measure of relative riskiness of issuing bank of security i after controlling for the bank assets (BA i,t ) since SRisk i,t is highly correlated with the magnitude of BA i,t , and (3) , , the 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread for security i's issuing bank at end of year t.
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, is a vector of control variables, including year dummies D 2010 and D 2011 , and interaction terms between year dummies and other independent variables. Table 14 shows the result of panel regression (2). Column (1) investors' financial debt holdings are more closely correlated with security-specific characteristics than with those at the issuer bank level other than the bank size.
Conclusion
In this paper we present evidence that U. (D 2010 and D 2011 ), as well as the interaction terms between the year dummies and the CDS spread and yield spread, respectively. Column (2) controls for country fixed effects. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels respectively.
(1 
S. Holdings of European Financial Debt
The results are from panel regression (2) using annual data from December 2007 to December 2011 for a subsample of U.S. holdings of financial debt securities issued by 43 major European banks. In column (1), U.S. holdings of a financial debt security sovereign debt as percentage of the total financial debt held (Pct_held t ) is regressed on the security's credit rating dummy (HR) and yield, as well as the issuer bank's 5-year CDS spread (CDS t ), its relative systemic risk contribution (SRisk/BA), bank assets ln(BA), year dummy variables for 2010 and 2011 (D 2010 and D 2011 ), as well as the interaction terms, respectively. In column (2), we include individual bank dummies to control of bank fixed effect. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels respectively.
